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Abstract 
 
We propose a global mechanism to finance sustainable development (SD) that offers a 
number of advantages over the current Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The 
mechanism would be multinational, provide incentives for rich and poor countries to 
promote SD, incorporate the principle of common, but differentiated, responsibilities and 
link incentives and funding for SD to structural benchmarks and performance targets. It 
would operate as a large fund into which rich countries would pay based on their level of 
population, per capita income and change in a measure of environmental sustainability. 
Receipts from the funds, called Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental 
Sustainability (CURES), would be made to poor countries based on their population, per 
capita income and absolute level of environmental sustainability. This approach 
differentiates payments and receipts on the basis of income, while rewarding 
improvements in environmental performance in rich countries, and making greater 
payments to countries with greater environmental problems. To promote flexibility, 
recipient countries would be able to trade, bank or borrow their assigned CURES, 
provided that the trade resulted in a verifiable improvement in environmental 
sustainability in the purchasing country. A reformed GEF that adopted the desirable 
features of CURES, if widely adopted and funded at a sufficiently high level, would offer 
a significant boost to global SD and would greatly assist poor countries to address the 
twin challenges of poverty and environmental degradation. 
 
Keywords: sustainable development, intergovernmental financial transfers, adjusted net 
savings, GEF 
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The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed 
and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority. International 
actions in the field of environment and development should also address the interests and 
needs of all countries. 
Principle 6, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development at The United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (12 August 1992). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Sustainable development (SD) became a widely accepted policy objective following 
the release of the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) in 1987. Its focus on the need for a collective resolution of global 
environmental problems led to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED).  Three important developments that came from UNCED include 
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCD), The United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) and The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Under all three agreements is the notion of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, that all countries bear a responsibility to 
address environmental challenges, but rich countries acknowledge a special responsibility 
in terms of supplying technologies and financial resources in the pursuit of SD. This 
principle was reaffirmed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held 
in 2002, which also called for common efforts to be made to promote the integration of 
economic development, social development and environmental protection as mutually 
reinforcing components of sustainable development (United Nations 2002). 
One of the mechanisms for achieving common, but differentiated, responsibilities is 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF is funded by rich nations and makes 
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transfers to poor countries to achieve specific environmental outcomes. As of February 
2002, the GEF had authorized payments to poor countries totaling over US$2 billion 
(World Bank 2002a) to cover the incremental costs associated with combating climate 
change, loss of biodiversity, degradation of international waters, stratospheric ozone 
depletion and persistent organic pollutants (World Bank 2002b).  Despite these payments 
and the existence of United Nations conventions on the global environment, fully 
integrated and effective global policies to improve overall environmental quality, 
especially in poor countries, have yet to fully materialize.  
The principal difficulties in improving environmental quality include the linking of 
the different causes and solutions to environmental degradation and the financing of 
projects that promote SD and capacity development, especially in poor countries. To help 
overcome these challenges, we propose an innovative global mechanism called Country 
Undertakings and Rights for Environmental Sustainability (CURES) to promote SD in 
both rich and poor countries, while recognizing common, but differentiated, 
responsibilities. In section 2 we present criteria that any global mechanism should fulfill 
to achieve the stated objectives of the UNCED and the WSSD. In section 3 we illustrate 
how CURES could be implemented with a numerical example. To show how the funds 
transferred under CURES might be utilized, we describe a potential application in 
Indonesia in section 4. Section 5 lists the advantages of CURES relative to the GEF, and 
argues that the GEF should be reformed to incorporate the desirable features of CURES. 
Concluding remarks are offered in section 6. 
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 2. Global Mechanisms for Sustainable Development 
 
Attempts have been made to address global environmental problems multilaterally 
through a variety of international conventions. A difficulty with such an approach is that 
it may be possible for a country to meet its international treaty obligations in terms of 
biodiversity, desertification, climate change and trans-boundary pollution, but for its 
environmental quality to decline. This may arise because of negative spillovers from 
other countries, or because of other causes of environmental degradation not specified 
under existing conventions.  
The issue is not that multilateral conventions are inappropriate, but that they are 
insufficient. In particular, there is insufficient funding under existing conventions and 
inadequate incentives for both donor and recipient countries to effectively address 
national, regional and global environmental problems. If the plan of action of the WSSD 
is to be realized new mechanisms that complement existing conventions are required. 
Some of these mechanisms are currently being developed such as ‘partnerships for 
sustainable development’ and some are partially in place, such as the GEF. Further 
developments in both funding and incentive mechanisms to promote global sustainable 
development are almost certainly required if the ambitious goals of the WSSD are to be 
realized.  The minimum conditions required of global mechanisms that promote SD are 
that they involve as many countries as possible, provide financial incentives for both rich 
and poor countries to promote SD, incorporate the principle of common, but 
differentiated, responsibilities and link incentives, finance and resources for SD to 
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measurable and accepted performance targets. Using these four principles, we present an 
innovative funding and incentive mechanism for global SD—Country Undertakings and 
Rights for Environmental Sustainability. 
 
3. Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental Sustainability (CURES) 
 
CURES would operate as a large fund into which rich countries would pay based on 
their level of population, a suitably defined income measure (such as GDP per capita) and 
the change in environmental sustainability. Contributions and receipts from the fund 
would be determined by a transparent funding formula that would encompass any project 
(small or large) provided that it promoted environmental sustainability.  
CURES receipts to recipient countries would resemble various direct payment 
initiatives that have been proposed for specific purposes, such as to maintain biodiversity 
(Ferraro and Kiss 2002) and reduce deforestation (van Soest and Lensink 2000). Two 
unique features of CURES would be, one, receipts could be spent on any project that 
contributes to environmental sustainability and two, could be traded across countries and 
over time. Transfers from the fund would be made to poor countries, below a given 
income threshold, based on their level of population, a suitable per capita income 
measure and an absolute level of environmental sustainability. This funding formula 
would allow for a smooth transition from recipient to donor countries. For instance, a 
recipient country very close to the income threshold would receive very little in CURES 
funding, while a donor country just above the per capita income threshold would pay 
only a small contribution.  
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In keeping with United Nations international conventions, the mechanism for 
promoting SD would be determined on a national basis.  However, the implementation of 
projects and undertakings to promote environmental sustainability would almost certainly 
involve partnerships between communities, different levels of government, non-
governmental organizations and private enterprises. Actual receipts, rather than the right 
to receive receipts from the fund, would be conditional on ensuring that any transfers to a 
country were spent on projects that promote environmental sustainability with verifiable 
performance criteria.  
Recipient countries would be assigned rights (called CURES) to receive payments 
from the fund, contingent on meeting the fund’s criteria for its expenditure. Countries 
that get assigned CURES would be able to sell them to other recipient countries.  The 
trade would be permitted by the fund provided that it resulted in a verifiable improvement 
in environmental sustainability in the purchasing country. This would allow for 
maximum flexibility and would help direct funds to where they have the highest 
perceived returns. Countries could also bank or borrow CURES directly with the fund or 
through inter-temporal trades with other recipient countries. Thus a country could arrange 
to ‘borrow’ a CURES receipt from another recipient country provided that it returned an 
agreed to CURES receipt at an agreed date. This would allow a country to borrow 
additional funds for up-front investment in particular programs, or bank CURES if its 
absorption capacity had not caught up with its allocation.  
3.1. Calculating CURES 
 
 6
Each country’s contributions to, or receipts from the CURES fund, would be 
calculated using appropriately defined measures of population size, per capita income and 
environmental sustainability. Countries would be split into either a contributor or a 
recipient group based on a per capita income threshold. Rich countries would pay into the 
fund (a higher income implies a larger contribution) while poor nations would receive 
CURES receipts from it (a lower income implies a larger receipt).  In addition to the per 
capita income threshold, the actual amount paid or received by each country would 
depend on its population (a larger population implies a greater contribution or a larger 
receipt) and level of environmental sustainability (better relative performance reduces 
both contributions and receipts). Different weights could also be assigned to each of three 
factors (population, per capita income and environmental sustainability) so as to give 
greater importance to any one of them. The appropriate weighting of the factors and the 
choice of the indicators for per capita income and environmental sustainability would be 
subject to international negotiations prior to the establishment of CURES. 
One way to calculate contributions and receipts is to derive a country factor derived 
from agreed-to measures of population size, per capita income and environmental 
sustainability. For ease of calculation and comparability, these measures would be 
normalized to be between 0 and 1, where a higher score implies either a larger 
contribution for a rich country, or a larger CURES receipt for a poor country. A value 
equal to, or below, the lower boundary of one of the three measures would be assigned a 
zero score, while a value at or above the upper boundary would be assigned a score of 
unity. Multiplying the normalized population, per capita income and environmental 
sustainability factors gives the country factor. For the two groups of countries, donors 
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and recipients, the country factors by donors would be used separately to determine 
relative contributions for donors, and the country factors for recipient countries to 
determine the proportional allocation of receipts to recipients. 
To calculate the dollar contribution or receipt for each country, each CURES country 
factor would be multiplied by a uniform adjustment factor that would ensure the total 
contribution and receipts equal the desired total size of the fund, less administrative 
costs. Thus a donor nation with a country factor twice that of another donor would 
contribute twice as much into the fund, but the actual contributions in dollar terms would 
depend on the size of the fund. Contributions to CURES, however, would not preclude 
rich countries from providing additional overseas development assistance (ODA) to meet 
the aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP that was reaffirmed by over 150 countries at the 
UNCED. 
A feature of the CURES formula is that if any of the three determining factors were 
zero, the CURES country factor would also be zero such that the country would make a 
zero contribution (if a rich country) or becomes ineligible for a CURES receipt (if a poor 
country). Thus a country in the contributors group that is very close to the per capita 
income threshold would score an income factor close to zero and would contribute very 
little into the fund. Similarly, the best environmental performance would be ‘rewarded’ 
with a zero environmental factor, exempting that country from having to make 
contributions and thus providing an added incentive to promote environmental 
sustainability.  
3.2. Choice of an environmental measure 
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To calculate contributions and CURES receipts, an acceptable measure of 
environmental sustainability is required. Given that environmental performance and 
sustainability cover many dimensions, a composite of different aspects of the 
environment and development would be best. For illustrative purposes only, and to show 
how CURES might be calculated, we use adjusted net savings (formerly called genuine 
savings) as a measure of environmental sustainability. It represents traditional net savings 
(gross national product less aggregate consumption less depreciation of produced capital) 
plus current education expenditures less the natural depletion in natural resources valued 
at the resource rental rate and less the net increase in stock pollutants valued at the 
marginal social cost of pollution (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). 
Whether adjusted net savings would be used in calculating CURES would, however, 
depend on the outcome of international negotiations over the appropriate indicators to use 
in the funding formula. Although by no means a perfect measure of environmental 
sustainability, adjusted net savings does have a number of advantages over alternatives as 
a measure of environmental sustainability. First, it can be independently calculated from 
the system of national accounts with an established methodology, and thus is relatively 
‘tamper proof’, and is also available for almost every country and over several years.  
Second, it is a broad measure of sustainable development and includes investments in 
human and produced capital as contributing to sustainability. Third, it is an accepted 
measure of sustainability and superior to other widely used indexes (Pearce et al. 1996), 
such as the human development index (Neumayer 2001). Fourth, adjusted net savings is 
flexible and can be modified (subject to negotiation) to reflect different SD priorities. For 
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instance, it could be changed to either not include investments in human capital or to 
enlarge the allowable deductions from natural capital in the calculation of net savings. 
For donor countries, we use the change in adjusted net savings through time, rather 
than comparing levels of adjusted net savings across countries to determine the level of 
contributions. This provides an additional incentive for rich countries to improve 
environmental sustainability as efforts to improve this measure are much more directly 
rewarded than if absolute levels of adjusted net savings were used. It also overcomes the 
potential problem that the measure depends, in part, on structural characteristics of 
countries. Further, the change in adjusted net savings is not correlated with income 
levels. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 where the change is calculated based on 
a five-year moving average.  
 
[Put Figure 1 here] 
 
By contrast to donor countries, it is desirable to differentiate CURES receipts 
according to structural characteristics so as to direct funds to countries with the greatest 
need. Figure 2 shows that adjusted net savings, as a percentage of GDP, vary enormously 
between countries, from below minus 30 to above plus 30 per cent. Negative adjusted net 
savings can be interpreted as an indicator of non-sustainability as it implies that the value 
of depletion of natural resources and cumulative pollution exceeds the national 
investment in produced and human capital. Despite the high variance, there is an 
identifiable positive correlation between adjusted net savings and income per capita. 
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[Put Figure 2 here] 
3.3. A Numerical Example 
 
To illustrate the relative contributions into and receipts from a CURES fund by 
country, we assume a CURES fund size of US$10 billion per year. Regardless of the size 
of the CURES fund, the relative contributions to and receipts from the fund would be 
determined by the calculated country factors. Banking and borrowing in each year would 
be approximately balanced. The choice of the actual fund size would depend on several 
factors including the ability and willingness to pay of contributors and the ability of 
recipient countries to absorb the funds in verifiable projects for environmental 
sustainability.  
For our numerical example, and purely for illustrative purposes, we assign a per 
capita GDP threshold of US$5,000. Thus countries with per capita income in excess of 
the threshold are potential contributors while countries below the threshold are potential 
recipients. An illustration of the net CURES receipts (contributions are treated as 
negative receipts) is provided in Figure 3 to show the smooth transition from recipient to 
donor countries at the income threshold. 
 
[Put Figure 3 here] 
 
3.3.1. Donor Countries 
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Using data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2001), 32 countries 
are potential contributors to the fund while all other nations are potential recipients.  
Contributions into the fund, however, would not preclude countries from making 
additional ODA funding on either a bilateral or multilateral basis. The CURES 
contributions are determined by the following factors, with an equal weight assigned to 
each.  
(a) Population, whereby more populous countries tend to pay more. For 1999, the 
population for the 32 contributing countries ranges from less than 1 million to 278 
million for United States. 
(b) GDP per person in US$, whereby richer countries tend to pay more. The per capita 
GDP in 1999 for the 32 countries ranges from US$5,000 (the income threshold) to 
US$36,232 (Switzerland). 
(c) Change in adjusted net savings as a proportion of GDP, whereby the greater the 
increase (or the smaller the decrease) in adjusted net savings, the less a contributing 
country will tend to pay. For our example, the change in adjusted net savings is defined 
as the difference in the 5-year moving average in the most recent period for which data is 
available (1995-1999) and the 5-year moving average in the immediate preceding period 
(1994-98). The range for the 32 contributing countries is -1 to just above +2 percentage 
points.  
To illustrate how the contributions from donors are calculated, Table 1 gives the 
normalized scores, CURES country factor and per capita and total contributions for the 
United States, Japan, Germany and Australia.  The United States is the largest country in 
the contributors group and scores a population factor of 1.0 while its per person income is 
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89 percent of that of the country with the highest per capita income, yielding an income 
factor of 0.89. Unlike the population and income factors that are increasing in the levels 
of population and per capita income, respectively, the environmental factor is inversely 
related to environmental sustainability. Consequently, the lower is the level of 
environmental sustainability, the larger the normalized environmental factor. For the 
United States, the change in adjusted net savings as a share of GDP from 1994-1998 to 
1995-1999 is minus 0.3 percentage points, which is in the bottom third of the defined 
range, and thus yields a relatively large environmental factor of 0.77. Multiplying the 
three factors, and giving them equal weight, yields a country factor of 0.69. Scaling this 
up, along with all other country factors, yields a US contribution of US$4.1billion, or 
around US$15 per person.  
Japan has the highest per capita contribution at around US$18, while Germany’s per 
capita contribution is just below the average of US$10. Australia, with a per person 
income close to the mid-point of the distribution, contributes at a below average per 
capita rate because of a slight increase in adjusted net savings over the defined period. 
 
[Put Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 compares the contributions and key indicators of the principal contributors 
into the CURES fund. The United States is the largest absolute contributor to CURES, 
accounting for 42 percent of global contributions, followed by the European Union (EU) 
and Japan that pay for 29 percent and 23 percent of the CURES fund respectively. On a 
per capita basis, the EU’s contributions are just over half that of the United States and 
 
well below the average, because of lower average incomes and improvements in adjusted 
net savings in a number of European countries over the period 1994-1998 to 1995-1999.  
 
[Put Table 2 here] 
 
The distribution of contributions in relation to per person income is plotted in Figure 
4, for all 32 countries (EU disaggregated). The positive correlation between per capita 
income and contributions reflects the influence of the income factor, while the variation 
in contributions for any given income level is due to differences in the adjusted net 
savings indicator.  Despite the positive relationship between contributions and GDP per 
capita, both Table 2 and Figure 4 show that contributions based on GDP alone are 
markedly different to the CURES funding formula. For example, if the contributions 
were based solely on total GDP, the US would contribute about eight percent more than 
the EU, while using the proposed CURES formula it contributes over 40 percent more 
into the fund than the EU. 
 
[Put Figure 4 here] 
 
Two countries have zero, or close to zero, contributions: Ireland, which increased its 
adjusted net savings by more than two percentage points during the period analyzed and 
is, thus, above the cut-off point for contributors; and the Czech Republic with a per capita 
income at just above the income threshold for contributors.  
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3.3.2. Recipient Countries 
 
Countries with GDP per capita below US$5,000 can potentially receive money from 
the CURES fund. Receipts from the fund by country are determined by the following 
criteria. 
(a) Population, whereby more populous countries tend to receive more CURES receipts. 
The population in 1999 for the 100 countries ranges from less than one million to 1.254 
billion (China). 
(b) GDP per person in US$, whereby poorer countries tend to receive more CURES 
receipts. For 1999, the income ranges from just over US$100 for the poorest African 
country to US$5,000, the threshold income level.  
(c) Adjusted net savings as a proportion of GDP, whereby countries with the lowest 
levels of adjusted net savings tend to receive more CURES receipts. We use the 5-year 
average of adjusted net savings for our calculations that ranges from  -36 to +31 as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 Table 3 provides an example as to how the CURES receipts are calculated for three 
recipient countries—Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria. Brazil is a populous country that 
receives a relatively small share of CURES funds because it has a relatively high (among 
recipient countries) per capita income. Indonesia, with a similar adjusted net savings rate, 
receives an allocation several times higher on a per capita basis because of its lower 
income level. Nigeria is a very poor country with an exceptionally low adjusted net 
savings. Consequently, its per capita income and adjusted net savings factors are both 
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close to 1, such that Nigeria would receive a per capita CURES receipt more than double 
the average of all recipient nations. 
 
[Put Table 3 here] 
 
Under the described calculation and weighting method, poor countries with large 
populations tend to receive more funding. However, a different weighting scheme that 
assigns, say, a greater importance to the environmental factor would result in a different 
distribution of receipts and would give greater priority to the level of environmental 
sustainability. Thus, depending on the weights assigned to the three factors (population, 
per capita income and environmental sustainability) the distribution of receipts could be 
very different.  
Table 4 presents the ‘top 10 list’ of recipient countries in terms of absolute receipts. 
The countries include a mix of large and medium-sized countries with either 
exceptionally low incomes or low adjusted net savings, or both, such as Nigeria and 
Ethiopia. Overall, the 10 largest recipient countries account for two thirds of total 
CURES receipts in our example.  
 
[Put Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 indicates that the top 10 list of countries in terms of CURES receipts per 
capita is dominated by smaller countries with either exceptionally low adjusted net 
savings or per capita income, or both. This group accounts for just 12 percent of global 
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CURES receipts, of which half is allocated to Nigeria. At around US$5 per person per 
year, receipts to this group are over twice the average per capita level. For every country 
in Table 5, with the exception of Nigeria, ODA is much higher than the calculated 
CURES receipts. 
 
[Put Table 5 here] 
 
The overall relationship between CURES receipts and per capita income is shown in 
Figure 5.  All countries with a per capita income of US$ 700 or less get a higher per 
person receipt than the average for all recipient countries.  
 
[Put Figure 5 here] 
 
3.4. Conditionality and Accountability 
 
In keeping with the experience of intergovernmental transfers in developing countries 
in the provision of efficient public services (Bird and Smart, 2002), recipient countries 
receiving CURES receipts would be required to meet conditions for funding. The sole 
purpose of the conditions would be to ensure funds were used as effectively as possible. 
These conditions would include a clear objective from the recipient country as to what 
would be achieved along with a statement of how the CURES receipts would be spent to 
meet the goal(s), with specified benchmarks to attain the performance targets. This 
approach would be a significant improvement over past performance of the GEF. For 
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instance, Young (2002, p. 211) notes in the second Overall Performance Study of the 
GEF released in 2002 that the evaluators found that only 12 percent of projects financed 
by the GEF since 1991 had received final evaluations or completion reports. 
To ensure accountability for CURES receipts, no country would be able to receive 
funds unless they were spent on a verifiable project with measurable benefits towards 
environmental sustainability. The verification would be undertaken by an independent 
body either within or linked to the CURES secretariat. Given that failures to achieve 
agreed-to outcomes could arise from factors beyond the control of recipient countries, 
each project would have defined ‘structural benchmarks’ (Adam and Gunning 2002). 
These benchmarks could also be related to a decision support system, or possibly critical 
threshold values defined for each project (Nijkamp and Vreeker, 2000). Failure to 
achieve initial benchmarks would trigger further investigation, and possibly technical 
assistance, to ensure project objectives were achieved. Persistent failures in meeting 
benchmarks would incur graduated sanctions culminating in the ultimate sanction of the 
freezing of all CURES funds allocated to a project. Such conditionality would assist 
recipient countries to meet targets and would provide a financial incentive to improve 
environmental sustainability.  
To help ensure that CURES receipts are directed to where they generate the greatest 
return, allocated annual receipts would be transferable between countries. This might 
occur in two different ways: one, inter-temporal trading of CURES among recipient 
countries and two, the selling of CURES among recipient countries. Both forms of 
trading would need to be approved by a CURES secretariat.  In the first case, trading 
would involve ‘borrowing’ a share of recipient’s country’s CURES to be repaid with 
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interest in the future in the form of CURES. In the second case, CURES would be sold 
for a financial consideration, but would trade at a discount or at less than its nominal 
value to reflect the fact that any disbursements from the fund must be spent on verifiable 
projects with measurable benefits. Regardless of the allocation mechanism, actual 
disbursements (as opposed to the right to receive a disbursement defined by CURES 
receipts) to any recipient country would, in every case, be conditional on projects or 
investments meeting defined criteria for environmental sustainability.  
 
  
4. A CURES Case-study: Forest Fires in Indonesia 
 
To show the potential of CURES to promote SD, we present a case study of the forest 
fires of Indonesia. The fires are an example of on-going environmental degradation that 
generates effects that run counter to the objectives of the UN conventions on climate 
change and biodiversity, but that escapes the funding mechanisms set up under these 
conventions. Equally as important, the problem is beyond the current means of the 
Indonesian government to address effectively (Varma 2003). 
4.1. Effects of the fires 
 
Indonesian forest fires occur mainly on the islands of Kalimantan (Borneo) and 
Sumatra. They cause the destruction of forests with associated loss of timber and 
ecosystem services such as flood protection and erosion control, result in biodiversity 
losses, and release large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Smoke from the fires 
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also contributes significantly to the ‘Asian brown cloud’, an area of high semi-permanent 
air pollution over large parts of Southeast Asia. 
The fires in Indonesia were particularly extensive in 1997-98. Over this period, the 
total area burned is estimated to be 10 million hectares, about half of which was 
forestland (Applegate et al. 2002). These fires generated an estimated cost of US$ 21 
billion in Indonesia alone, or an amount equal to some eight percent of its GDP (Varma 
2003). As a direct result of these fires, a drop in the numbers of rare and endangered 
animal species has been recorded. Smoldering fires in peat forests were particularly 
devastating, causing most of the haze problem, as well as generating very large carbon 
emissions. Page et al. (2002) estimate that between 0.8 and 2.6 gigatons (1 gigaton = 1 
billion tons) of carbon were released from peat lands in the 1997-98 fires—equivalent to 
between 13 percent and 40 percent of total annual global carbon emissions from fossil 
fuel combustion.  
4.2. How CURES could help 
 
The fires occur for a combination of reasons—climatic, economic, social and 
institutional. Fires are particularly extensive in years of drought, which are generally 
associated with El Niňo-Southern Oscillation events. In such years, fires spread more 
easily and take longer to be extinguished by rain. A significant cause of fires is clearing. 
The culprits are both commercial companies that find fire the most cost effective way of 
clearing native vegetation for establishing plantations, as well as semi-nomadic farmers 
clearing land for shifting agriculture. In both cases, the damages from fire are largely 
external to those who set them, and fires are rooted in private economic considerations. 
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Fire is also used as a weapon in conflicts between villagers or with plantation companies 
(Colfer, 2002). In all of these cases, the virtual absence of law enforcement and 
institutions for fire prevention is at the heart of the problem. In addition, the institutional 
capacity to detect and fight fires is seriously underdeveloped. 
Addressing the problem requires both political will and financial muscle. If the 
Indonesian government had large financial resources available for both preventing and 
fighting forest fires, this could provide both the incentive and the means for action. 
CURES could be the source of funding for an outcome-oriented program to reduce forest 
fires. A coordinated program for fire prevention and management could comprise a 
number of measures. Applegate et al. (2002, pp. 303ff.) propose policy initiatives to 
reduce the occurrence and spread of fires including land-use zoning and management, 
land clearance, drought and fire prevention and institutional strengthening. CURES could 
help in each initiative by providing incentive payments to regional governments to 
implement and enforce zoning and regulations, to fund fire prevention, pay for additional 
personnel on the ground, and pay for mechanical clearing as well as providing alternative 
employment for shifting cultivators (Varma 2003), where appropriate.  CURES could 
even be used to buy off formal or informal property rights from plantation companies. 
This could take the form of annual payments to concession holders, subject to the land in 
question not being burned.  
Under our illustration of a US$ 10 billion annual CURES fund, Indonesia would 
receive around US$ 400 million per year. If additional funds were needed for a limited 
period of time, for example for buying off land use rights and setting up institutions and 
technical equipment, Indonesia could borrow additional CURES from the fund and pay 
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them back by drawing on its allocation in future years. Continued funding would, 
however, depend on the money being put to good use, and strict performance standards 
would have to be applied to avoid the funds being siphoned into other uses. If CURES 
could go even some way to reduce the incidence and severity of future forest fires in 
Indonesia, it would make a large contribution to protecting biodiversity and reducing 
carbon emissions relative to almost any other global policy initiative.  
 
5. Reforming the GEF 
 
The proposed CURES funding mechanism shares a number of similarities with the 
GEF that is managed through the World Bank. In particular, they both represent global 
funding mechanisms for SD that direct resources from rich to poor countries. There are, 
however, substantial differences between the two approaches, with several desirable 
features that are unique to CURES. Given the advantages of CURES, but the fact that the 
GEF already exists, we argue that the best course of action is to reform the GEF in its 
next replenishment in 2006 and incorporate at least some, and preferably all, of the 
desirable features of CURES. 
One of the most obvious differences between the existing GEF and CURES is that 
receipts from the CURES fund would be much more transparent and open than is true 
with the current GEF. At present, the allocation of funds under the GEF is dependent on 
the projects brought by countries and NGOs to it, and its changing funding priorities. 
Under CURES, countries would be able to predict (with a small margin of error) their 
future receipts as the factors (measures of income, population and environmental 
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sustainability) used to calculate CURES receipts would not change substantially from 
year to year. Thus recipient nations could plan better their development strategies and 
project implementation. The transparency in funding to countries would also help avoid 
the perception of political interference in determining payments that has been identified 
as a potential problem with the GEF (Young 2002, chapter 4).  
Another important difference between the two mechanisms is that the contributions 
into the fund by donor countries will be more equitable with CURES. This is because the 
richer the country and the poorer its relative environmental sustainability performance, 
the proportionally greater its contribution. For example, under the GEF the US 
contributes less than a quarter of the total funds while under the CURES mechanism it 
would contribute over 40 percent of the total. To illustrate the differences, a comparison 
of the relative contributions under CURES and the GEF, by selected donors, is presented 
in Table 6.  
 
[Put table 6 here] 
 
CURES would also help address apparent inequities under the GEF whereby some 
poor countries (China, Cote d’Ivoire, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey) are also donors, 
each making contributions of up to 0.5% of the total fund. Thus fixing national 
contributions and receipts to an agreed to formula is both politically neutral in 
implementation and would favor poorer countries—characteristics that should allow 
CURES to garner greater international support and enlarge the opportunities for SD 
planning. 
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One of the more useful features of CURES is the added incentive they provide for 
donor countries to improve their environmental sustainability. In particular, countries that 
improve their measure of environmental sustainability relative to their peers contribute 
proportionally less to the fund. This incentive would likely be more than just a financial 
benefit as it should give the leaders of better performing countries ‘bragging rights’ both 
domestically and internationally. In terms of poor countries, the CURES receipts would 
also provide an important source of funding. Further, with conditionality based on 
structural benchmarks, critical thresholds and final evaluations and auditing of all 
funding, CURES would provide strong national incentives to improve environmental 
sustainability. 
Another important benefit of CURES, relative to the GEF, is its in-built flexibility 
that allows for inter-temporal trade-offs with CURES banking, and improved efficiency 
in the funding allocation with CURES trading. For example, a country that may have 
difficulties in absorbing current CURES receipts can ‘bank’ the funds for future use. In 
addition, trading of CURES between countries would help promote efficiency in the 
sense that projects with the highest perceived national benefits could be funded via a 
market mechanism.  
The administration of CURES also offers a number of desirable characteristics in 
terms of the allocation of funds. Under the GEF, for instance, funding has nominally been 
targeted to cover ‘incremental’ or additional costs so as to allow projects with national 
benefits to generate global benefits (GEF, 2003). Further, funds have primarily been 
directed to projects that meet the stated objectives of the United Nations environmental 
conventions, such as the UNFCCC or UNCBD. By contrast, whether projects generate 
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national or global benefits is irrelevant in terms of what poor countries have the right to 
receive in CURES. Thus CURES enlarges the set of potential projects and allows 
countries to undertake projects that only generate national benefit.  
CURES offer an example of what could be achieved with a reformed GEF, should 
there be a fourth replenishment beyond the current GEF funding round scheduled to end 
in 2006. A GEF that used the CURES mechanism would be more responsive to recipient 
country needs, promote greater efficiency with banking and trading, offer the potential of 
a more streamlined process of disbursement and assessment, and provide additional 
incentives for rich countries to promote environmental sustainability. Improved 
sustainability outcomes associated with CURES, relative to the current GEF, may even 
increase the willingness of donor countries to contribute to the fund while also giving 
recipient nations a greater role in the funding, planning and implementation of SD.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
It is some thirty years since the first United Nations conference on the environment 
and over a decade since the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development. Despite some significant gains in terms of livelihood and environmental 
quality, many of the laudable goals of these conferences remain unrealized.  
To help address on going environmental and development problems, a new and 
innovative mechanism that promotes sustainable development is proposed, called 
Country Undertakings and Rights for Environmental Sustainability (CURES). The 
CURES funding mechanism has a number of advantages over existing institutions, such 
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as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). Ideally, CURES would involve all countries 
and would promote overall environmental sustainability, provide financial incentives for 
both rich and poor countries to improve national environmental performance, incorporate 
the principle of common, but differentiated, responsibilities and link incentives to 
verifiable and measurable accepted performance targets. A reformed GEF that adopted 
the desirable features of CURES, if widely adopted and funded at a sufficiently high 
level, would offer a significant boost to global sustainable development and would 
greatly assist poor countries to address the twin challenges of poverty and environmental 
degradation. 
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Table 1: Examples for calculating contributions to CURES  
 
 United States Japan Germany Australia
 Indicators: 
 Population (million) a 278 127 82 19 
 GDP/person (US$'000/year) a 33 34 26 21 
 Change in adjusted net savings (% of 
GDP) b,c 
 
-0.3 -0.6 
 
0.0 
 
0.2 
 Factors (normalized and truncated): 
 Population factor 1.00 0.45 0.30 0.07 
 Income factor 0.89 0.94 0.66 0.52 
 Adjusted net savings factor 0.77 0.88 0.65 0.60 
 Multiplication of factors (with equal weights): 
 Country factor 0.6889 0.3761 0.1281 0.0212 
 Contributions into a US$10 billion CURES fund:  
 Total contributions (US$million/year)   4,165   2,274   775   128  
 Contribution per person 
(US$/person/year)  
 14.97   17.96   9.44   6.77  
Data source: World Bank (2001) and authors’ calculations. 
a Data for 1999 
b Change between 5-year averages 1994-98 and 1995-99. 
c Data for the period examined was Genuine Savings. 
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Table 2: Contributions to the CURES fund  
 
 Contributions to CURES Indicators for CURES calculation memo 
 US$/ 
person 
US$ 
million 
share 
of total 
(%) 
Population 
(m) a 
GDP/ 
person 
($000s) 
a 
Change in 
adjusted net 
savings 
(percentage 
points) b,c 
Average 
adjusted net 
savings 1995-
99 (% of GDP) 
c 
United States  14.97 4,165 41.7 278.2 32.9 -0.3 9.0 
Japan  17.96 2,274 22.7 126.6 34.3 -0.6 18.0 
European 
Union  
7.77 2,915 29.1 375.0 22.6 average: 0.1, 
range: -0.4 to 
+2.1 
average: 14.3, 
range: 8.8 to 
28.7 
Others d 3.18 646 6.5 203 13.8 average: 0.4, 
range: -0.8 to 
+1.2 
average: 13.9, 
range: -30 to 
+41 
Total or 
average 
10.17 10,000 100 983 25.2 average: 0.2, 
range: -0.8 to 
+2.1 
average: 12.9, 
range: -30 to 
+41 
Data source: World Bank (2001) and authors’ calculations. 
a Data for 1999 
b Change between 5-year averages 1994-98 and 1995-99. 
c Data for the period examined was Genuine Savings. 
d Comprises Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Canada, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea (Rep.), 
Kuwait, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
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Table 3: Examples for calculating CURES receipts 
 
 Brazil Indonesia Nigeria 
Indicators: a 
Population (million) 168 207 124 
GDP/person 
(US$’000/year) 
4.5 0.7 0.3 
Adjusted net savings  
(% of GDP) b 
12.1 16.5 -15.2 
Factors (normalized and truncated): 
Population factor 0.134 0.165 0.098 
Income factor 0.105 0.862 0.943 
Adjusted net savings 
factor 
0.465 0.392 0.920 
Multiplication of factors (with equal weights): 
Country factor 0.00656 0.05585 0.08574 
Receipts from a US$10 billion CURES fund: 
Total receipts 
(US$million/year) 
48.9 416.6 639.6 
Receipts per person 
(US$/person/year) 
0.29 2.01 5.16 
 
Data source: World Bank (2001) and authors’ calculations.  
a Data for 1999 
b Data for the period examined was Genuine Savings. 
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Table 4: Receipts from the CURES fund: the 10 largest recipient countries  
 
 CURES receipts  Indicators for CURES calculation 
 US$/ 
person 
US$  
(millions) 
share of 
total 
(%) 
Population 
(millions) a 
US$ 
GDP/per 
capita a,b 
Adjusted net savings, 
average from 1995-99 
to 95-99 (% of GDP) b 
India 2.86 2,854 28.5 998 448 8.3 
China 0.84 1,056 10.6 1,254 789 29.9 
Nigeria 5.16 640 6.4 124 283 -15.2 
Pakistan 3.39 457 4.6 135 431 2.6 
Indonesia 2.01 417 4.2 207 688 16.5 
Bangladesh 2.98 381 3.8 128 360 7.6 
Ethiopia 4.71 296 3.0 63 103 -8.5 
Russian 
Federation 
1.63 238 2.4 146 2,746 3.6 
Vietnam 2.99 232 2.3 78 370 7.5 
Philippines 2.54 188 1.9 74 1,031 7.8 
Sum of the 10 
largest recipients 
2.11 6,757 67.6 3,205 696 16.9 
90 remaining 
recipients 
2.11 3,243 32.4 1,535 2,040 10.4 
total or average 2.11 10,000 100.0 4,740 1,131 13.1 
 
Data source: World Bank (2001) and authors’ calculations. 
a Data for 1999 
b Data for the period examined was Genuine Savings.
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Table 5: Receipts from the CURES fund: the 10 countries with the highest per 
capita payments  
 
 CURES receipts  Indicators for CURES calculation 
 US$/ 
person 
US$ 
(millions) 
share of 
total 
(%) 
Population 
(millions) a 
US$ 
GDP/ 
per 
capita 
a,b 
Adjusted net savings, 
average from 1995-99 
to 95-99 (% of GDP) b 
Eritrea 5.76 23 0.2 4 162 -30.9 
Yemen, Rep. 5.47 93 0.9 17 400 -22.2 
Lesotho 5.46 11 0.1 2 415 -36.6 
Armenia 5.37 20 0.2 4 484 -21.5 
Azerbaijan 5.35 43 0.4 8 502 -32.1 
Nigeria 5.16 640 6.4 124 283 -15.2 
Mauritania 4.97 13 0.1 3 369 -14.2 
Sierra Leone 4.95 24 0.2 5 135 -11.3 
Haiti 4.73 37 0.4 8 551 -13.6 
Ethiopia 4.71 296 3.0 63 103 -8.5 
 
Data source: World Bank (2001) and authors’ calculations. 
a Data for 1999 
b Data for the period examined was Genuine Savings. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Total Contributions by Selected Donors under CURES and 
Current GEF 
 
 CURES GEF (3rd replenishment) 
   
United States 41.7 22.2 
EU 29.2 46.3 
Japan 22.7 18.8 
 
 
Sources: GEF (2002) and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 1: Change in Adjusted Net Savings and Per Capita GDP (Donor Countries) 
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Note: Change in adjusted net savings is difference in 5-year moving average between 1995-99 
and 1994-98. The data used is for the period when Adjusted Net Savings were known as Genuine 
Savings. Differences may exist in the two series. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Level of Adjusted Net Savings and Per Capita GDP (Recipient Countries) 
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Note: Data used is for 1999 when Adjusted Net Savings were known as Genuine Savings. 
Differences may exist in the two series. 
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Figure 3: Net CURES receipts and Per Capita GDP 
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Figure 4: Net CURES Receipts and Per Capita GDP 
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Figure 5: CURES contributions and Per Capita GDP 
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